Chasing the Sunlight: Disclosure of Corporate Contributions to Political Action Committees in Nevada After Citizens United by Beavers, Wade
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-3\NVJ301.txt unknown Seq: 1  5-JUN-14 7:22
CHASING THE SUNLIGHT: DISCLOSURE OF
CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO
POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES IN
NEVADA AFTER CITIZENS UNITED
By Wade Beavers*
INTRODUCTION
In 1913, US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis wrote in Harper’s
Weekly that “[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”1 While Justice
Brandeis intended his words to be a metaphor for the positive effects that jour-
nalism and publicity could have in an American society under the control of an
over-concentration of industrial wealth, academics and non-profit organizations
have adopted the sentiment as a rallying cry for transparency in the new world
of corporate election spending.2
Since 2010, when the US Supreme Court handed down its famous Citizens
United decision allowing corporations to expend unlimited amounts of money
to affect the outcomes of elections and ballot measures,3 many states have
passed laws to address the effects of that influence on local elections. The legis-
lative focus has frequently been on corporate contributions to the increasingly
important “political action committees” (sometimes termed “PACs” or “Super
PACs”), which use the funds received from corporate sponsors to influence the
outcomes of elections.4 While the Citizens United decision clearly directs that
it’s unconstitutional for a state entity to prohibit corporate contributions to
PACs, the Court also made it very clear that there remains constitutional room
for states and the federal government to require PACs to disclose the amounts
and sources of the funding they receive.5 In Nevada, registration and disclosure
requirements for PACs have become the new front line of contention between
* Juris Doctorate Candidate, May 2014, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas. Thanks to Professor Sylvia Lazos, William S. Boyd School of Law;
Kevin Benson at the Nevada Attorney General’s Office; and my friends and co-staff at the
Nevada Law Journal for help and guidance.
1 Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WEEKLY, Dec. 20, 1913, at 10.
2 See, e.g., Sunlight Intern, Brandeis and the History Of Transparency, SUNLIGHT FOUND.
(May 26, 2009, 10:47 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2009/05/26/brandeis-and
-the-history-of-transparency/; Charles Kolb, Campaign Finance Disclosure Sunlight Is
Needed, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 28, 2010, 9:57 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/charles-kolb/campaign-finance-disclosu_b_801881.html.
3 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
4 Mary Winter, Super PACs at the State Level: A Different Story, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.
(Apr. 16, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.cjr.org/the_kicker/super_pacs_at_the_state_level.php.
5 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915. See also infra Part II.
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election overseers in the Secretary of State’s Office and the managers and
funders of PACs who would otherwise prefer to remain anonymous.
Nevada’s campaign disclosure laws were amended in 2013 to clarify lin-
gering issues in the State’s registration and disclosure requirements.6 There are
essentially two steps to determining whether a corporate contribution must be
disclosed. First it must be determined if the receiving organization is classifia-
ble as a “committee for political action” under NRS 294A.0055(b)(1) or NRS
294A.0055(b)(2).7 Second, it must be determined if the contributions were
“received for the purpose of affecting the outcome of any primary election,
primary city election, general election, general city election, special election or
any question on the ballot.”8
The Nevada Legislature’s attempts to refine the state’s registration and
disclosure requirements are indications of progress in light of Nevada’s signifi-
cant interests in placing tight controls on in-state political expenditures. This
Note will argue, however, that NRS 294A.230(2) should be further amended,
replacing the language
When reporting contributions as required by this chapter, a person who qualifies as a
committee for political action . . . is required to report only those contributions
received for the purpose of affecting the outcome of any primary election, primary
city election, general election, general city election, special election or any question
on the ballot.
with
When reporting contributions as required by this chapter, a person who qualifies as a
committee for political action . . . is required to report all contributions except where
the contributor has explicitly designated that the contributed funds not be used for the
purpose of affecting the outcome of any of the following in the State of Nevada: a
primary election, a primary city election, a general election, a general city election, a
special election or any question on the ballot.
This would place the burden on corporate donors to specifically earmark
their contributions for purposes other than influencing elections in order to
avoid having their contributions disclosed. Such a change would provide cer-
tainty in Nevada’s disclosure scheme. The change also evinces the larger pur-
pose of this Note—encouraging a progressive approach to independent
spending disclosure in Nevada.
Part I of this Note provides relevant history and a brief discussion of the
basic constitutional issues underlying campaign finance at both the state and
federal level. Part II provides a look at some of the developing issues in elec-
tion spending disclosure at the state level. Part III examines Nevada law with
particular attention to exactly how far Nevada’s disclosure requirements go. It
also suggests that those requirements might constitutionally be extended. Part
IV proposes and explains the above-described amendment to NRS 294A.230.
Part V concludes that the State of Nevada should become a leader in enacting
6 S.B. 246, 77th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2013) (deeming any organization a committee for political
action that either has as its primary purpose the goal of affecting a Nevada election or ballot
question, or any group that receives or makes expenditures in excess of $5,000 a year for that
purpose).
7 NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.230(2) (2013).
8 Id. § 294A.230(2)(b).
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new and effective election-funding disclosure requirements in order to serve
traditional democratic interests, in addition to Nevada’s unique interests as a
growing and developing state.
I. CONTEXT AND HISTORY OF LAWS AFFECTING CORPORATE SPENDING
A. Two Key Distinctions
1. Independent Spending vs. Direct Contributions
The law has evolved to distinguish between two major types of campaign
spending: independent spending and direct contributions.9 Independent spend-
ing involves funds that groups or individuals spend, independently of candi-
dates themselves, to advocate for the election or defeat of a particular
candidate, or for the passage or defeat of a particular ballot measure.10 Direct
contributions are funds that groups or individuals give to a particular candidate
for his or her own campaigning.11 Importantly, states and the federal govern-
ment may constitutionally place limits on direct expenditures but, after Citizens
United and predecessor case Buckley v. Valeo,12 may not restrict independent
expenditures without running afoul of the First Amendment. In general, this
Note focuses on laws that affect disclosure of funding for independent expendi-
tures—a major activity of PACs operating in Nevada.13
9
“Independent spending” is a term that is conflates several types of spending, including
“independent expenditures” and “electioneering communications.” Richard Briffault, Updat-
ing Disclosure for the New Era of Independent Spending, 27 J.L. & POL. 683, 683 n.1
(2012). These types of independent spending each have distinct legal meanings but, for the
purposes of this Article, fit within the broader category of “independent spending” as it is
defined here. See id. 
10 Id. Most people will be familiar with independent political spending by way of the now
ubiquitous campaign advertisements during election cycles with no disclaiming endorsement
by a particular candidate at the beginning or end. PACs running these ads should not be
confused with campaign organization for individual candidates, which are directly author-
ized and controlled by individual candidates or political parties themselves. See NEV. REV.
STAT. § 294A.0055 (defining “Committee for political action” as an organization not directly
controlled by a political candidate).
11 See Daaron Kimmel, Public Corruption Concerns and Counter-Majoritarian Democracy
Definition in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265,
273 (distinguishing between independent contributions to parties or committees and contri-
butions made directly to candidates—“direct contributions.” These types of donations are
sometimes also referred to “soft” money and “hard” money, respectively).
12 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
13 It should be remembered, however, that PACs may legally contribute money received
from corporations directly to campaigns. This is authorized both under federal law and under
Nevada law. For federal law, see Prohibitions on Contributions, Expenditures and Election-
eering Communications, 11 C.F.R. § 114.2 (2011); Separate Segregated Funds, 11 C.F.R.
§ 114.5 (2011); Contributions Brochure, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov
/pages/brochures/contrib.shtml#Corporations_Labor_Banks (last visited Apr. 30, 2014).
Direct contributions by PACs and even corporations themselves are authorized under
Nevada law, although subject to the same direct contribution limits applied to individuals—
$5,000. At least in Nevada, this low limit on direct contributions makes independent spend-
ing the clear choice for any corporation or PAC seeking to exert influence over elections and
ballot measures.
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2. Associational Disclosure vs. Direct Disclosure
Courts may also distinguish, for purposes of First Amendment analysis,
between (1) disclosure requirements that call for an organization or association
to report information about its donors (which I’ll refer to as “associational”
disclosure); and (2) those that force an individual or corporation to report its
own spending independently (which I’ll refer to as “direct disclosure”). This
Note proposes an amendment to the Nevada statute requiring associational dis-
closure for PACs, although it is important to note that statutes mandating direct
disclosure exist as well.14
B. Federal Election Law
Over the past fifty years, constitutional considerations at issue in state
campaign finance law have been guided by the US Supreme Court’s analysis of
those same issues as they’ve arisen, bit by bit, in federal campaign finance law.
As an understanding of those Supreme Court cases concerning federal law is
essential to an understanding of Nevada election law issues, a basic history of
federal election law is provided here.
The first federal campaign expenditure disclosure law was passed in
1910.15 The law contained a provision requiring “organizations which shall in
two or more States influence the result . . . of an election” to disclose the names
of contributors who had given over $100.16 Spending that occurred outside the
umbra of a committee or organization “for the purpose of influencing or con-
trolling, in two or more states, the result of an election” had to be reported if it
exceeded $50.17 The law was soon expanded to include expenditures made
relevant to nomination efforts, such as primary campaigns or party conven-
tions.18 These laws were passed and expanded during the height of the Progres-
sive Movement, a time when many in the US were crusading to improve citizen
access to the lawmaking process and break the hold that concentrated industrial
wealth had obtained on American politics.19
Federal disclosure requirements became even stronger with the passage of
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925.20 That act defined political commit-
tees as organizations that accept contributions or make expenditures “for the
purpose of influencing or attempting to influence the . . . presidential or vice-
presidential electors (1) in two or more States, or (2) . . . [as] a subsidiary of a
national committee.”21 It required such committees to report total contributions
and expenditures, including the names and addresses of anyone who contrib-
14 See NEV. REV. STAT § 294A.210 (2013) (requiring persons and committees for political
action to independently report their own political expenditures in excess of $1,000).
15 Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822.
16 Id. at 823.
17 Id. at 824.
18 Act of Aug. 19, 1911, ch. 33, 37 Stat. 25, 25–29.
19 THE CONCISE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 61–62
(Michael Kazin et al. eds., 2011).
20 Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925).
21 Id.
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uted $100 or more or any individual or group being the recipient of $10 or
more in a calendar year.22
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) and its amendments
in 1974 constituted the next serious legislation on election financing and
replaced all federal laws on the issue up to that time.23 In relation to indepen-
dent political spending, FECA limited expenditures by individuals or groups
“relative to a clearly identified candidate” to $1,000 per candidate per elec-
tion.24 FECA also required any individual or group, other than a candidate or
political committee, to file a statement concerning those expenditures.25 The
statements were to be filed with the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”),
also created by the act.26 Compelling the disclosure of election spending infor-
mation became one of the FEC’s major duties.27
The effort to increase transparency was supplemented in 2002 by the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”), commonly known as the
McCain-Feingold Act.28 The act was passed in response to a proliferation of
political issue advertising on television during federal campaigns.29 Proponents
of the act argued that corporations have a disproportionate ability to influence
the decisions of voters by pouring thousands of dollars into advertising cam-
paigns attacking or defending certain candidates.30 Among other things, the Act
amended federal law to create a ban on corporate-sponsored “electioneering
communications,”31 within sixty days of a general election.32
C. Buckley v. Valeo and the Constitutionality of Required Disclosure
Early in the history of the regulation of political expenditures, opponents
of regulation sought to tie the right to spend money on politically motivated
advertisements (and to be free from disclosing that spending) to the free speech
guarantees of the First Amendment. The 1976 case Buckley v. Valeo is consid-
ered the first key case on this issue, and addressed the application of numerous
22 Id. at 1071.
23 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3.
24 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 39 (1976) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (Supp. IV
1970)).
25 Federal Election Campaign Act § 304.
26 Id.
27 FED. ELECTION COMM’N, THIRTY YEAR REPORT 9 (2005).
28 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
29 Administrative Law—Campaign Finance Regulation—D.C. Circuit Again Invalidates
FEC Regulations Implementing Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002: Shays v. FEC,
122 HARV. L. REV. 1541, 1541 (2009) (“BCRA was enacted in response to what had become
a meltdown of the campaign finance system. Its aim . . . was to rid American politics of two
perceived evils: the corrupting influence of large, unregulated donations called soft money,
and the use of issue ads purportedly aimed at influencing people’s policy views but actually
directed at swaying their views of candidates.”) (internal quotations omitted).
30 Id.
31 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 201 (discussing “electioneering communica-
tions” as a subset of independent spending).
32 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887, 897 (2010).
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FECA provisions to individuals.33 At over 170 pages, the Buckley decision
reads like a treatise on the justices’ views of the various legal consequences of
campaign finance laws.34 In the case, US Senator James L. Buckley of New
York and a group of other politicians filed suit against Francis R. Valeo, the
Secretary of the Senate and the federal government’s representative for the
FEC, alleging that certain provisions of FECA violated both the First Amend-
ment right to free speech and the Fifth Amendment right to equal protection.35
The plaintiffs challenged the validity of FECA’s disclosure and reporting
requirements with respect to independent expenditures and direct contributions
by individuals,36 as well as FECA’s explicit limitations on those types of
spending.37
The Court applied strict scrutiny to FECA’s associational disclosure provi-
sions under a theory of First Amendment “associational privacy,”38 a concept
first articulated in the case of NAACP v. Alabama.39 In NAACP, the compelled
disclosure of the names and addresses of individual members of an organiza-
tion was found to be a substantial restraint and a violation of the First Amend-
ment right to privacy.40 In Buckley, however, the Court reached the opposite
result, upholding each of the FECA disclosure requirements.41 It identified the
government’s interests in disclosure generally as (1) providing the electorate
with information “as to where political campaign money comes from and how
it is spent by the candidate”; (2) deterring actual corruption and avoiding the
appearance of corruption by exposing large contributors to the light of public-
ity; and (3) collecting data to ensure compliance with contribution limita-
tions.42 The Court acknowledged that requiring disclosure even of names and
addresses of contributors to political organizations appeared to be the least
restrictive means possible to curb the “evils of campaign ignorance and corrup-
tion that Congress [has] found to exist.”43
33 See Trevor Potter, Campaign Finance Reform: Relevant Constitutional Issues, 34 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1123, 1125 (2002) (describing the Buckley opinion as the “seminal explication of
basic campaign finance principals”).
34 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See also Potter, supra note 33.
35 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7, 11.
36 It should be noted that the disclosure provisions at issue in Buckley are split between the
categories of disclosure described herein. See supra Part I.A. The requirements pertaining to
independent spending involved “direct” disclosure, see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74, whereas the
requirements pertaining to direct contributions to candidates involved “associational” disclo-
sure. Id. at 75. Ultimately, though, the Court applied the same type of First Amendment
analysis to each type of disclosure, and upheld both, noting that “the right of associational
privacy . . . derives from the rights of the organization’s members to advocate their personal
points of view in the most effective way.” Id.
37 Id. at 12–13, 60.
38 Id. at 75.
39 The theory of “associational privacy” is based on the idea that effective advocacy for
public and private points of view, particularly in the case of controversial views, is enhanced
by group assembly, and that invasive government actions constituting a substantial restraint
on that group assembly run afoul of the First Amendment. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 462 (1958).
40 Id.
41 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60–61.
42 Id. at 66–68 (internal citation omitted).
43 Id. at 68.
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The Court left future litigants with at least one caveat, however. It
acknowledged the possibility that the type of associational disclosure at issue
could conceivably be unconstitutional as applied to “minor parties.”44 The con-
cern, also at issue in NAACP v. Alabama, involved the possible exposure of
contributors to unpopular organizations to physical and economic reprisal for
their participation in supporting the organization or cause.45 To address this
concern, the Court in Buckley established a test whereby “minor parties” are
exempt from compelled disclosure of contributors’ names if disclosure would
reasonably subject them to “threats, harassment, or reprisals.”46
However, while such a showing was certainly achievable for a civil rights
organization in the 1950’s, as was the case in NAACP, the likelihood of such a
showing by any of the Super PACs usually affected by contemporary state and
federal disclosure laws is slim. Buckley continues to stand as strong support for
the constitutionality of a wide variety of campaign disclosure laws. The Court’s
reasoning would be further reinforced more than three decades later in Citizens
United v. FEC.
D. Citizens United v. FEC – Limitations Struck Down, Disclosure Upheld
Much has been written about the reasoning and ramifications of the
Court’s decision in Citizens United. For the purposes of this Note, however, the
relevance of the case to Nevada campaign disclosure requirements is two-fold.
First, concerns about the role of corporate contributions to PACs for the pur-
poses of independent political spending are significantly magnified after the
decision, as will be further illustrated later in this article. Second, the Court’s
reasoning in the decision so strongly invokes the logic and practical use of
disclosure requirements in addressing these concerns that state legislatures
should feel encouraged to seek creative disclosure solutions in the future and
still feel confident in the constitutionality of those measures. The pertinent facts
of the case, as they relate to the foregoing points, are described below.
On December 13, 2007, a relatively unknown nonprofit corporation and
PAC called Citizens United filed a complaint in federal court challenging the
application of BCRA disclosure and disclaimer requirements to ads for a movie
it had produced, Hillary: the Movie.47 The organization also sought a ruling
that federal bans on the use of corporate treasury funds for certain types of
independent political expenditures were unconstitutional violations of the First
Amendment.48
The Court found that bans on corporate contributions to independent polit-
ical speech were unconstitutional.49 It determined that such bans were suppres-
sions of political speech “on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity,” and
determined that “[n]o sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the
44 Id. at 68–69.
45 Id. at 68; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462.
46 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 69, 74. See also Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm.,
459 U.S. 87, 108 (1982) (describing and applying the “harassment” test in the context of
campaign disbursements).
47 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886–87 (2010).
48 Id. at 892–93.
49 Id. at 913.
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political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”50 The practical result
of the Court’s decision was to explicitly invalidate federal statutes limiting or
banning the use of corporate funds for independent political spending,51 while
also implicitly invalidating as unconstitutional all similar state laws.52
With respect to the issue of the disclosure and disclaimer requirements,
Citizens United was less successful. The Court found both the disclaimer and
the discloser requirements constitutional as applied to the ads and the movie.53
Federal law after BCRA required that certain types of independent political
communications include a disclaimer that “_______ is responsible for the con-
tent of [the] advertising.”54 The law also required that any person (here con-
strued to include corporations) spending more than $10,000 a year on such
independent communications identify the person making the expenditure, the
amount of the expenditure, the election to which the communication was
directed, and the names of certain contributors.55
Citizens United argued that the required disclosure of the identities of
those who donated to support the movie project and the advertisements would
subject its supporters to retaliation, and chill speech.56 The Court used the as-
applied test from Buckley to determine if there existed a reasonable probability
that he group’s members would face “threats, harassment, or reprisals” if the
members’ names were disclosed, and determined that no such evidence
existed.57 The Court also rejected arguments that the requirements were under-
inclusive or that the disclaimer requirements decreased “both the quantity and
effectiveness of the group’s speech by forcing [speakers] to devote four
seconds of each advertisement to the spoken disclaimer.”58
The Court, in fact, emphatically reiterated its endorsement of disclosure
requirements as a “less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regula-
tions of speech.”59 This nod to disclosure represents, perhaps, a prescient
understanding of the dynamic changes states and the federal government would
have to contend with in the aftermath of the Court’s decision—states’ new
inability to restrict or ban unwanted contributions by corporations for the pur-
poses of independent political spending.
II. STATE DISCLOSURE LAW AND CONSIDERATIONS, GENERALLY
As expected, the Citizens United decision had a damning effect on state
prohibitions and limitations on corporate funding for political advertising.60 In
50 Id. 
51 See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2012).
52 Briffault, supra note 9, at 687.
53 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914.
54 Id. See also 2 U.S.C. § 441d(d)(2) (2012).
55 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914; 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1).
56 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915.
57 Id. at 914.
58 Id. at 915.
59 Id.
60 Life After Citizens United, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org
/research/elections-and-campaigns/citizens-united-and-the-states.aspx (last updated Jan. 4,
2011).
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all, twenty-four states had such laws on the books at the time of the decision.
Since then, nearly all have been explicitly repealed, with the rest being implic-
itly nullified.61
The new inability to control corporate political spending has caused an
increasing focus on disclosure at the state level. In total, twenty-one states have
changed their disclosure laws since Citizens United.62 Today, nearly every state
has some form of disclosure requirement for independent political expenditures
and contributions.63
Of the states, Alaska, California, and North Carolina have perhaps the best
examples of ambitious disclosure requirements. Alaska requires every PAC
registered in the state to disclose all contributions made to it, as well as the
“name, address, . . . principal occupation and employer of the contributor.”64
Alaska defines a “contribution” as a payment being made “for the purpose of
influencing the nomination or election of a candidate” or “for the purpose of
influencing a ballot proposition or question.”65 In addition, Alaska requires that
all groups running independent political ads list the top three donors supporting
the ad by name and address in the ad itself.66
California requires committees to disclose the names and street addresses
of each person “who has provided consideration for an independent expenditure
of one hundred dollars ($100) or more.”67 California also requires individuals
or corporations that make “contributions” in excess of $10,000 a year to regis-
ter as a “committee.”68 The state defines a payment to a PAC as a “contribu-
tion” unless “it is clear from the surrounding circumstances” that it is not made
for political purposes.69
North Carolina requires individuals and entities to file statements report-
ing all independent expenditures over $100.70 The law also requires those enti-
ties to identify all individuals or entities contributing $100 or more “if the
donation was made to further the reported independent expenditure or
contribution.”71
61 Id. Montana fought the nullification of state prohibition on independent expenditures all
the way back to the US Supreme Court, which held that the state law was unconstitutional in
light of Citizens United in 2012. See generally Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S.
Ct. 2490 (2012).
62 ROBERT M. STERN, CORP. REFORM COAL., SUNLIGHT STATE BY STATE AFTER Citizens
United 6–7 (2012), available at https://www.citizen.org/documents/sunlight-state-by-state
-report.pdf.
63 Id. at 8–34. Even in states where there is no requirement that reports of expenditures or
contributions be filed with a secretary of state’s office, there may be requirements that the
names of persons or organizations funding the ads be disclosed within the ads themselves.
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 3-9-3-2.5(d) (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-1354 (2013); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 22-25-110 (2013).
64 ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.040(a)(1) (2013).
65 Id. § 15.13.400(4)(A).
66 Id. § 15.13.090(a)(2)(C).
67 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84203.5(b)(5) (West 2014).
68 Id. § 82013(c).
69 Id. § 82015(a).
70 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.12(a) (2013).
71 Id. § 163-278.12(c).
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Other states have passed legislation focused on fostering open relation-
ships between the corporations funding speech and their own board members
and shareholders. Iowa passed a law requiring, among other things, that corpo-
rate board members approve independent political spending by a corporation,
although significant parts of this law were struck down as unconstitutional by
the Eighth Circuit in 2013.72 Maryland requires that independent spending be
disclosed directly to shareholders of a corporation.73
In recent years, litigation over state disclosure requirements has frequently
involved constitutional challenges to state definitions of “PAC” and “indepen-
dent political expenditure.” In Buckley, the US Supreme Court sought to clarify
which organizations could constitutionally qualify as political committees for
the purposes of entity-wide disclosure.74 According to the Court, a political
committee is any organization that is under the control of a candidate or the
“major purpose” of which is the nomination or election of a candidate.75 The
definition of a “major purpose” would then turn on the amount of an organiza-
tion’s expenditures that are made for the purpose of influencing elections.76
Organizations and donors seeking to avoid disclosure requirements have long
sought to characterize their communications during election cycles as “issue
advocacy” rather than “express advocacy”—communications of general opin-
ions on public issues as opposed to explicit pleas for the election or defeat of a
particular candidate. This distinction was recognized in Buckley77 and survives
today in challenges to state disclosure laws.78
Despite these repeated (and usually unsuccessful) challenges, however,
and despite several successful constitutional challenges to more creative disclo-
sure approaches, as was the case in Iowa, states have generally been able to
sustain meaningful disclosure regulation in the wake of Citizens United. States
should continue to take progressive approaches to disclosure regulation when,
as is the case in Nevada, the law is still in flux and the state has legitimate
interests in managing the influence of Super PAC money in local elections.
III. NEVADA DISCLOSURE LAW AND CONSIDERATIONS
A. Nevada Disclosure Law
Nevada’s statutory scheme for regulating disclosure of election expendi-
tures is scattered throughout NRS chapter 294A. The basic components
involve:
72 IOWA CODE § 68A.404 (2013). See also Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717
F.3d 576 (8th Cir. 2013).
73 MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 13-306 (West 2014).
74 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 78–79 (1976).
75 Id. at 79.
76 Briffault, supra note 9, at 692.
77 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79–80.
78 See, e.g., Human Life of Wash. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010); Yamada v.
Weaver, 872 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Haw. 2012); Alliance for America’s Future v. State ex
rel. Miller, No, 56283, 2012 WL 642540, at *1 (Nev. Feb. 24, 2012).
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• Defining certain entities as “committees for political action” and
requiring their registration with the Nevada Secretary of State’s Office
(NRS 294A.0055; NRS 294A.230);
• Requiring self-disclosure of independent expenditures by committees
and individuals (NRS 294A.210);
• Requiring entities and individuals making independent political
expenditures to disclose contributions (NRS 294A.140); and
• Requiring entities and individuals who make independent political
broadcasts costing over $100, such as TV or radio ads to disclose “on
the communication” the name of the entity or person paying for the
communication (NRS 294A.348).
As described in Part I, this Note will not directly address Nevada’s scheme
for requiring self-disclosure, or “direct disclosure.” Instead, it will focus on the
requirements whereby committees for political action must disclose the names
of contributors and the amounts of contributions. Two issues commonly arise
from this scheme. First, when must a committee register as a committee for
political action? Second, what types of contributions must they disclose?
Before 2013, the definition of “committee for political action” defined
such entities as
any group of natural persons or entities that solicits or receives contributions from
any other person, group or entity and . . . makes or intends to make contributions to
candidates or other persons; or . . . makes or intends to make expenditures designed
to affect the outcome of any primary, general or special election or question on the
ballot.79
That definition was amended and clarified during the most recent Legisla-
tive Session. NRS 294A.0055 now defines a “committee for political action” to
include corporations with their “primary purpose” as affecting the outcomes of
elections or questions on the ballot. It also includes corporations whose “pri-
mary purpose” is not affecting elections, but that receive contributions or make
expenditures of more than $5,000 in a given year.80 This inclusiveness will
likely serve to ensure that most, if not all, organizations functioning as PACs in
all but name only will be forced to register and comply with the resulting
requirements.
Once an entity registers as a PAC, this registration triggers the contribu-
tion disclosure requirements of NRS 294A.140. This statute requires that
2. Every [committee] shall, not later than January 15 of each year . . . for the period
from January 1 of the previous year through December 31 of the previous year,
report each contribution in excess of $1,000 received during the period and contribu-
tions during the period from a contributor that cumulatively exceed $1,000.
. . .
10. The name and address of the contributor and the date on which the contribution
was received must be included on the report . . . .81
79 NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.0055(1) (2007). Understandably, this definition was perceived
by many as vague, prompting entities to avoid registration and disclosure and forcing the
Secretary of State’s Office to initiate litigation in some cases. See Alliance for America’s
Future, 2012 WL 642540, at *1–2.
80 NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.0055 (2013).
81 Id. § 294A.140.
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NRS 294A.140 also requires disclosure of contributions in excess of
$1,000 in close proximity to elections.
While chapter 294A also contains a definition of “contribution” in NRS
294A.007, that definition is qualified in the statute requiring registration of
committees for political action—NRS 294A.230. NRS 294A.230(2) states that
2. A person who qualifies as a committee for political action in accordance with
[NRS 294A.0055] shall, not later than 7 days after [a qualifying event triggering the
registration requirements] register with the Secretary of State on forms provided by
the Secretary of State. When reporting contributions as required by this chapter, a
[committee] is required to report only those contributions received for the purpose of
affecting the outcome of any primary election, general election, special election, or
any question on the ballot.
This language clearly operates to exclude contributions to PACs from reporting
requirements wherever it can be argued that they were not explicitly “received
for the purpose of” influencing an election. As described more fully in Part IV,
this offers PACs and their contributors a loophole to avoid disclosure, a prob-
lem which should be addressed by amending NRS 294A.230.
While recent amendments to chapter 294A have improved Nevada’s abil-
ity to regulate independent political expenditures in its own elections, this par-
ticular area of law is still developing, and more improvements can always be
made. The amendment to NRS 294A.230 suggested in Part IV should be a part
of a more comprehensive plan to make Nevada’s election finance disclosure
laws the most evolved and effective in the nation. As described below,
Nevada’s significant interests in being on the cutting edge of this area of the
law ensure that any laws passed will have a strong case for meeting even the
stricter scrutiny applied where they implicate the First Amendment.
B. Nevada’s Substantial Interests in Progressive Campaign Finance
Regulation 
Nevada’s ability to manage and regulate spending in state elections must
pass strict scrutiny as a restraint on First Amendment expression, but any chal-
lenge to a campaign finance law in the Silver State should take into account the
unique local circumstances that make transparency in election financing an
even more compelling state interest than it is at the federal level.
First, Nevada’s population is disproportionately small compared to its siz-
able political influence. Nevada’s population in 2012 was estimated to be
2,754,354.82 Between May 2012 and the presidential election in November
2012, two of the largest Super PACs in the nation, American Crossroads and
Priorities USA Action, spent $8,723,836 in Nevada seeking to influence the
election.83 These figures are in stark contrast to another “battleground” state,
Pennsylvania, which had an estimated population in 2012 of 12,764,475, with
82 Nevada, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/32000.html (last
visited Apr. 30, 2014).
83 Ad Spending in Presidential Battleground States – Nevada, NAT’L J., http://assets.nation-
aljournal.com/gfx/Ad_spending_in_presidential_battleGround_states_iframe2.html (last vis-
ited May 3, 2014).
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the same two Super PACs spending a combined total of only $3,096,742.84
Likewise, in Michigan, with a population of 9,882,519, those same two Super
PACs spent a combined total of $740,415.85 When broken down to dollars per
capita, Pennsylvania saw expenditures of just over 24 cents per person and
Michigan saw expenditures of just 7 cents per person. Nevada, by contrast, saw
$3.16 spent per person.
This external interest will continue to be a factor as Nevada grows. In
2012, following the completion of the 2010 U.S. Census, the Silver State was
awarded a new House of Representatives district.86 This necessitated a redis-
tricting of the State’s federal congressional districts in 2011, a task which
proved to be contentious and arduous, with the Legislature eventually propos-
ing a map drawn by a Supreme Court of Nevada-appointed panel.87  The redis-
tricting process, while nominally left to state legislators, attracted national
attention and interest for its effect on the political landscape in the house.88
Said one representative of a national Hispanic lobbying group on his group’s
interest in the process, “Nevada is certainly a priority state for the Latino
community.”89
As Nevada continues to grow, the likelihood that the State will gain even
more representation at the national level is high. The determination of whether
a seat will be safely Republican or Democrat may again come down to the
votes of a handful of Nevada legislators. It is not difficult to imagine races for
local seats, then, attracting national interest and the type of Super PAC inde-
pendent spending that can dramatically sway an election one way or the other.
Nevada’s interest in maintaining its own autonomy through disclosure require-
ments is therefore very substantial.
Second, Nevada has a history of political corruption and outside influence,
and strict disclosure requirements are necessary to reverse the long tradition of
public distrust. Nevada was founded in 1864, shortly before the true national
golden age of corruption in politics.90 Popular belief has long held that Abra-
ham Lincoln allowed the state to enter the Union during the heart of the Civil
War so that he could gain access to the vast sums of wealth being taken out of
84 Wisconsin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/42000.html
(last visited Apr. 30, 2014); Ad Spending in Presidential Battleground States – Penn-
sylvania, NAT’L J., http://assets.nationaljournal.com/gfx/Ad_spending_in_presidential_bat
tleGround_states_iframe2.html (last visited May 3, 2014).
85 Michigan, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26000.html (last
visited Apr. 30, 2014); Ad Spending in Presidential Battleground States – Michigan, NAT’L
J., http://assets.nationaljournal.com/gfx/Ad_spending_in_presidential_battleGround_states
_iframe2.html (last visited May 3, 2014).
86 Laura Myers, Nevada Gains Seat in U.S. House, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (Dec. 21, 2010, 8:28
AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/government/nevada-gains-seat-us-house.
87 Lois Beckett, In Nevada, Opaque Groups Square Off Over Redistricting, PROPUBLICA,
(Nov. 9, 2011, 3:08PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/in-nevada-opaque-groups-square
-off-over-redistricting.
88 Ramsey Cox & Elsie Viebeck, Nevada, Texas Illustrate Difficulties of 2012 Redistricting,
HILL (Oct. 24, 2011, 9:15 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/news/189275-nevada-texas
-illustrate-difficulties-of-2012-congressional-redistricting.
89 Id.
90 John Brant, How Nevada Became a State, HUMANITIES (May 2, 2010), http://www
.humanities360.com/index.php/how-nevada-became-a-state-25320/.
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Nevada’s gold and silver mines.91 Stories of early Nevada politics are riddled
with the examples of lavish spending by wealthy mine owners-cum-politicians
and relative out-of-towners from California seeking to exert control over state
legislation.92 A history of Nevada published in 1912 told the following story:
In the fall of [18]72 John P. Jones, who had been beaten in his fight two years
previous when running as the Sheriff of Maraposa [sic] County, Cal., came into the
fight for the United States Senatorship. Since his advent into Nevada he had suc-
ceeded in mining and had reaped a fortune from the Bonanza uncovered in Crown
Point.
. . . .
When fairly in the campaign . . . he began scattering money with a lavish hand
and inaugurated the system which for years ruled in Nevada whenever a man with
political ambitions sought a seat in the Upper House of Congress.93
In the same passage, the 1912 history describes a negative national reputa-
tion that evolved as the influence of money and politics in Nevada proved to be
overwhelming: “[F]rom the beginning Nevada only sent its wealthy men to the
Senate of the United States. This earned for the State the name of the ‘Rotten
Borough’ and this name seems destined to cling to it.”94
Nevada’s unsavory reputation for corrupt politics continued into the mid-
dle of the Twentieth Century. Attracted to the Nevada by the allure of gambling
deregulation, the rise of the Mob in Las Vegas during the 1950s did nothing to
alleviate this problem. Las Vegas Sun editor, Hank Greenspun, famously wrote
in 1950, “A sharp 10-year-old boy could have come to the conclusion that
crime and politics in this state are on friendly terms.”95
The statute requiring disclosure of campaign expenditures, NRS
294A.210, was passed in 1983, near what is commonly viewed as the end of
Mob influence in Las Vegas.96 Since that time, Nevada citizens have been able
to access information about political spending in their own state and to weigh
the competing messages accordingly. The damage done to a state’s political
reputation and own self-perception by a history of corruption is not undone
overnight, however. The unique history of corruption in Nevada makes mea-
sures ensuring wide availability of information about political communications
a necessity.
Third, political spending in Nevada has such a profound impact on the
local economy that requiring disclosure of information relevant to different
types of spending is compelling at an economic level, as well as a political
level. Nevada is often held up as a cautionary example of why diversity in an
91 Id.
92 1 THE HISTORY OF NEVADA 420–21 (Sam Davis ed., 1912).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 423.
95 Ed Koch & Mary Manning, Mob Ties, LAS VEGAS SUN (May 15, 2008, 3:00 AM), http://
www.lasvegassun.com/news/2008/may/15/mob-ties/.
96 NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.210 (2013); Richard N. Velotta, Las Vegas According to Three
Governors: The Fall of the Mob, a Land of Prostitutes and Potential Terrorism Risks,
VEGAS INC (Apr. 27, 2013, 2:00 AM), http://www.vegasinc.com/business/real-estate/2013
/apr/27/las-vegas-according-three-governors-fall-mob-land-/.
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economy is essential to long-term success.97 The State’s failure to move
beyond a one-dimensional, service-oriented casino and tourism industry has
been cited as one of the key reasons that the Great Recession hit so hard in
Nevada and one of the main reasons that the state maintains one of the highest
unemployment rates in the nation.98
The attention brought by the 2012 election cycle, however, generated suf-
ficient ad revenue that it could arguably constitute an entire industry in and of
itself. By the middle of October in 2012, the presidential campaigns had spent a
total of $49 million on advertising in Nevada.99 Less data is available on the
amount spent on state campaigning, but the point is clear—politics is big busi-
ness. In a state still gasping for economic air, a new state interest in political
spending arises. In addition to state interests in disclosure that have been listed
by the Supreme Court in cases like Buckley (providing the electorate with
information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding the appearance of corrup-
tion, and collecting data to ensure compliance with contribution limitations),100
smaller states where political spending contributes to the health of the local
economy may have an additional interest in disclosure driven by the need to
track where money originates.
It could be argued that, by mandating disclosure of campaign expendi-
tures, Nevada is advancing its economic interests by accumulating information
that could later be used for the purposes of economic development. Perhaps, by
learning where and how wealthy organizations or individuals spend their
money, private advertising agencies in the state can create a better, more effi-
cient, and more attractive industry where political advertisements are being
financed.
IV. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO NRS 294A.230(2)
In light of the foregoing, I propose an amendment to NRS 294A.230(2) in
order to avoid one particularly glaring problem for Nevada disclosure require-
ments. This change should be considered a small component of what is
intended to be the greater spirit of this Note—encouraging a progressive
approach to independent spending disclosure in Nevada.
As described above, NRS 294A.230(2) requires political action commit-
tees to disclose contributions they receive for independent political spending.
The specific language of the provision reads
When reporting contributions as required by this chapter, a person who qualifies as a
committee for political action . . . is required to report only those contributions
received for the purpose of affecting the outcome of any primary election, primary
97 Richard N. Velotta, State’s Czar of Economic Diversification on Where we Were, Where
We’re Going and How We’ll Get There, VEGAS INC (July 30, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www
.vegasinc.com/news/2012/jul/30/states-czar-economic-diversification-where-we-were/.
98 Local Area Unemployment Statistics, BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/web/laus
/laumstrk.htm (last modified Apr. 18, 2014).
99 Domenico Montenaro, Ad Spending Tops $800 million; on Pace to Reach or Come Close
to $1 billion, NBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2012, 9:35 AM), http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news
/2012/10/17/14511630-ad-spending-tops-800-million-on-pace-to-reach-or-come-close-to-1
-billion?lite.
100 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–68 (1976).
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city election, general election, general city election, special election or any question
on the ballot.
The problem with this language is that it would allow a corporation or
individual to contribute money to a registered political committee and still
avoid disclosure so long as the committee can argue that the money was not
explicitly received for the purpose of affecting the outcome of an election.
PACs conceivably have numerous functions outside of influencing elections in
a particular state. They might lease or manage office space. They might run
internship programs or employment drives. Under the law as it stands, a hypo-
thetical corporation might make a donation to a PAC for “general support,”
giving the committee the opportunity to argue that it need not disclose the con-
tribution as it was not received for the particular purpose of influencing an
election. The spirit of the law is clearly undermined by the fact that, in such a
circumstance, the money might still be used for the purposes of influencing an
election, so long as it was not “received” for that purpose.
In light of this potential problem, I propose the following change to the
language of NRS 294A.230(2):
When reporting contributions as required by this chapter, a person who qualifies as a
committee for political action . . . is required to report all contributions except where
the contributor has explicitly designated that the contributed funds not be used for
the purpose of affecting the outcome of any of the following in the State of Nevada: a
primary election, a primary city election, a general election, a general city election,
a special election or any question on the ballot.
The proposed change will ensure that corporations or wealthy individuals
are not able to keep their contributions anonymous by earmarking those contri-
butions for ambiguous purposes. Instead, it places the burden on the contributor
to explicitly earmark the funds for a purpose other than influencing state elec-
tions if it wishes to avoid disclosure.
Such a change would put Nevada near the leading edge of states in this
area. As described in Part II, Alaska defines a “contribution” as a payment
being made “for the purpose of influencing the nomination or election of a
candidate” or “for the purpose of influencing a ballot proposition or ques-
tion.”101 This language suffers from the same defect as the current language in
NRS 294A.230(2). The proposed change would put Nevada more in line with
California’s approach, whereby the state defines any payment to a PAC as a
“contribution” “unless it is clear from the surrounding circumstances that it is
not made for political purposes.”102
The problem of corporations seeking to avoid disclosure is a real one.
Recent history has shown that corporations want to remain anonymous—in
2010, Target Corporation was forced to apologize to employees after it was
revealed the corporation had donated $150,000 to a Minnesota group support-
ing an anti-gay marriage candidate.103 At the same time, corporations are also
demonstrating an increased desire to get into the political arena. One report
showed that corporate contributions to PACs in 2012 accounted for 23% of
101 ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.400(4)(A) (2013).
102 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82015 (West 2014).
103 Anna Palmer & Abby Phillip, Corporations Don’t Pony Up for Super PACs, POLITICO,
(Mar. 8, 2012, 11:55 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/73804.html.
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total funding for super PACs, already up 4% from 2010 numbers.104 This ten-
sion between what corporations want to see and what they fear creates an
incentive to find loopholes. Closing the loophole in NRS 294A.230(2) will bet-
ter ensure that the disclosure regulations in place actually work. In this way,
Nevada will be able to regain some of the control over corporate influence that
it lost with Citizens United.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the area of law dealing with required disclosure of contributions
towards independent political expenditures is still evolving to meet the modern
election-spending landscape, Nevada should be taking the reigns and continu-
ously working to improve its existing state controls. Progressive action in the
area of election spending is a necessity in today’s world of broadcast political
messages and big-money interests. Disclosure fulfills all of the substantial state
interests advanced in cases like Buckley—providing the electorate with infor-
mation, deterring actual corruption and avoiding the appearance of corruption,
and collecting data to ensure compliance with state law—and may fill, perhaps,
interests particular only to Nevada. As the state grows, and as the influence of
intra-state organizations in political processes grows, Nevada owes it to its citi-
zens to improve transparency both by fixing small problems and by working to
develop a more effective scheme overall, one that gives individual voters the
greatest amount of information possible about the political messages they
receive.
104 T.W. Farnam, Corporations are Sending More Contributions to Super PACs, WASH.
POST (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/corporations-are-sending
-more-contributions-to-super-pacs/2012/02/02/gIQAL4dYlQ_story.html.
